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The Specter of Violence that Haunts the
UDHR: The Turn to Ethics and Expertise
VASUKI NESIAH*

I. INTRODUCTION
The ratification of the Genocide Convention just a day before the
ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is
a potent reminder of how intimately the backdrop of war and mass
atrocity haunts the UDHR and the mobilization of the human rights
framework in post-conflict situations. This paper focuses on human
rights in the shadow of war by examining international interventions
advancing rights through peace building and democracy promotion
initiatives in post-conflict regimes.1 From Timor to Cambodia,
Afghanistan to Liberia, Sierra Leone to Nepal, we see the role of the
international community in ‗nation building‘ and peace processes,
advancing rule of law and democracy promotion programs. This
paper does not examine the impact of the human rights regime on
culture; rather, it examines the ‗culture‘2 of human rights interventions themselves and, in particular, interventions in post-war
contexts. I suggest that the backdrop of genocide, war, or other

* Director of International Affairs and lecturer in international relations, Brown University.
1. The specter of violence plays a key role in many areas of human rights. For instance,
contemporary discourse on Islam and women‘s rights in the human rights literature often
foregrounds the threat of violence in ways that have shaped the trajectory of human rights
interventions on that issue. However, this paper is confined to a claim about the constitutive
role of violence in defining rights promotion in the post-conflict world. It does not discuss
the role of violence in relation to human rights more generally.
2. I use ―culture‖ to refer to a reading of certain symptomatic elements (in particular, the
role of expertise and the role of ethics) in the assemblage of rules, norms, and practices that
constitute this sub-field of human rights work.
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forms of mass violence have been invoked and interpolated to
develop a particular culture, or style of interventions regarding rights
and democracy promotion, that is characterized by two related
turns—the turn to ethics and the turn to expertise. The specter of
mass violence functions to legitimate and shape this style of intervention at the expense of a closer interrogation of what is authorized
in the name of rights in the shadow of war.
The rest of this paper proceeds by first describing the work done
by the representation of the violence of conflict and post-conflict
societies. The following sections describe the human rights and
democracy promotion paradigm and flesh out the turn to expertise on
the one hand, and ethics on the other. I wrap up with some concluding thoughts on the UDHR and the specter of mass violence that
haunts rights within the history of international intervention.
Illustrative references to the representation of violence in Sri
Lanka and Sri Lanka‘s experience with the post-conflict industry
emerge as a thread running through this paper. From 2002 to 2006 a
peace process facilitated by the Norwegian government produced a
ceasefire that interrupted the war between the Government of Sri
Lanka and the militant group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
That period saw the country flooded by human rights and democracy
promotion initiatives that are key dimensions of the post-conflict
interventions. While this paper does not conduct a comprehensive
case study of Sri Lanka, human rights and democracy promotion
initiatives in the country recur as reference points in different sections
of this paper.
II. THE WORK OF VIOLENCE IN HAUNTING HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE
Histories of the UDHR inevitably have as a foreground the
historical setting in which it emerged. In the wake of World War
Two, the declaration was an affirmation of humanism in the wake of
mass murder on an unprecedented scale. Mass violence defines the
threat to which human rights and democracy promotion interventions
respond and also creates the normative and practical urgency that
propels these interventions.
For many, violence, human rights violations on the body, has a
rapacious capacity to devour ―the political.‖ Violence is a thing
apart, an uncontrolled and uncontrollable phenomenon that destroys
the possibility of law, reason, and the realm of the political. Mahmud
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Mamdani argues that the modern political sensibility has a twopronged view of violence. On the one hand, there is the violence of
the French and American revolutions or of the World Wars that
emerges as rational violence, violence that can be celebrated as the
sacrifice of life for a higher cause.3 Here violence is seen as the
engine of history, embedded into the story of progress.
On the other hand, there is another dominant story about violence
and this is the story of violence that is beyond explanation. The
internecine conflicts in Africa and South Asia are invariably placed in
this category.4 The Sri Lankan author Michael Ondaatje describes
the war in Sri Lanka, the very real history of violence of the
insurgency against which his novel Anil’s Ghost is set, as something
that can be likened to the random brutality of natural catastrophes:
―Pompeii. Laetoli. Hiroshima. Vesuvius. Tectonic slips and brutal
human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical
lives.‖5 This violence defies a progress narrative and cannot be
situated in a march to higher order principles that will redeem, rather
than condemn, the brutality of conflict. Rather, a country scarred by
this kind of ‗unthinkable‘ violence is a failed state that has
interrupted history‘s march; it is a political terra nullius that requires
external intervention to restore a model of governance that allows its
people to march forward into history rather than be weighed down by
primordial conflicts. This is the backdrop for the dominant terrain of
human rights work in post-conflict contexts. This is the threat against
which human rights and democracy promotion is erecting its armor.
The production of a country such as Sri Lanka as a conflict zone
on the international radar screen has many different markers. Most
obviously, today it enters the pages of the global media primarily
through the narrative of war—stories of suicide bombs and aerial
attacks, militant terrorists and war-mongering politicians.
In
academia, Sri Lanka became, at various points, the paradigmatic
reference point for the anthropology of violence,6 the sociology of
terrorism,7 or political science case studies of conflict resolution and

3. Mahmood Mamdani, Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa,
IDENTITY, CULTURE AND POL., Dec. 2002, at 1, 5.
4. Id. at 2.
5. MICHAEL ONDAATJE, ANIL‘S GHOST 55 (2001).
6. See Pradeep Jeganathan, ‘Violence’ as an Analytical Problem: Sri Lankanist
Anthropology After July, ‘83, NĒTHRĀ Q. J., July–Sept. 1998, at 9.
7. Thus the study of Sri Lanka helps to credentialize a range of ‗noted terrorism experts‘
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its failures.8 In the corridors of the U.N., Sri Lanka‘s past
prominence in policy debates regarding human development indices
gave way to its reemergence in new discussions regarding humanitarian emergencies, war crimes, and the responsibility to protect.
Concomitantly, Sri Lanka was descended on as a field operation for
conflict-resolution focused NGOs and International NGOs (INGOs).
International donors began to channel their Sri Lanka funds to
activities that fall within a peace-building rubric and development
projects were launched under the auspices of mantras to ‗conflict
sensitivity.‘ Moreover, struggles over justice and citizenship get
channeled into the terrain of humanitarianism and human rights as
these domains garner increasing traction as buttressing efforts to raise
the barricades against the onslaught of violence. Across these many
spheres, Sri Lanka gets interpolated through the echo of battle noise:
a conflict zone has been produced.
As violence, or the threat of violence, becomes the meta-narrative
through which Sri Lanka becomes ‗known,‘ the work of human rights
takes a form that reflects the long reach of the catastrophic violence
that birthed the UDHR. That haunting of the UDHR by the ghosts of
genocide is recreated every time the UDHR‘s doctrinal, normative,
and institutional progeny are invoked in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan,
Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and indeed in the numerous contexts
where violence emerges as the lens through which that country gains
visibility on the international radar screen. These are the contexts
where the international community says that in this bloody
battleground, at this tragic moment, the human rights framework is
urgent, necessary, and our only lifeline.
In haunting human rights in this way, I argue that violence
performs a ground clearing operation that sanctions a particular
culture of intervention. Violence produces contexts of conflict,
heaving, seething grounds of incendiary clashes where violence over
determines any intelligible ideological claims or political reference

such as Rohan Gunaratna, Head of the International Center for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research in Singapore, Peter Chalk, Senior Political Scientist of the RAND
Corporation in the United States, and Gérard Chaliand, former Director of the European
Center for the Study of Conflicts in France.
8. See, e.g., CREATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA: CIVIL WAR AND RECONCILIATION (Robert I.
Rotberg ed., 1999); Bidisha Biswas, The Challenges of Conflict Management: A Case Study
of Sri Lanka, 8 CIVIL WARS 46 (2006).
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points. In other words, these are ideological terra nullius where
international intervention is not political in any sense that violates
sovereignty or democratic self-determination. Rather, just as the 16th
and 17th century international law doctrine of terra nullius opened
land peopled only by the ‗savages‘ of yesterday for colonial
occupation by European powers, the land occupied by violence was
free for international intervention. Intervention itself is then rendered
apolitical and, in fact, like the European occupations of the previous
centuries, brings regions mired in the still waters of their hellish
present into historical time and the promise of progress. The
legitimacy of intervention is premised on the intertwined ethics and
pragmatics that are intervention‘s co-travelers; just as colonialism
would bring land classified as terra nullius into productive use
recognized by European states, international intervention would draw
countries overrun with violence into the community of nations so that
they too can conjoin their futures with a universal progress narrative.
Such countries are not just failed states,9 but places where there has
been a failure of norms and standards for the respect of rights and the
rule of law. This underscores the urgency to act but it also defines
the task—namely to institutionalize rescue politics in these tumultuous environments. This is why human rights and democracy promotion are not about ideology but about humanitarianism. Just as the
Red Cross sees itself as offering politically neutral humanitarian aid,
these international interventions to promote rights, democracy, and
the rule of law are normative security blankets that help protect and
heal us from the ravages of mass violence. The most interesting and
important dimension of this picture, for the purpose of this paper, is
less the moral condemnation of the racist or imperial hubris in this
narrative, but more a tracking of how representation that traffics in
violence profits the production of legitimacy for intervention.
III. THE TURN TO EXPERTISE AND ETHICS
What is the nature of the international intervention that enters the
post-conflict environment to fight violence? I would argue that there
are two dimensions to interventions that are empowered by the
backdrop of violence that should be highlighted. The first is the turn
9. ―Failed States‖ is a term of art in the good governance and development literature that
has very specific indicators regarding economic performance and administrative functions.
It is used more loosely in the wider conflict/post-conflict literature to refer to states mired in
long term conflict; this paper refers to the latter, more colloquial usage.
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to expertise, and the second is the turn to ethics. If the turn to ethics
gets manifested in efforts to promote a human rights culture, the turn
to expertise gets manifested in the professionalization of human
rights. The next few pages elaborate on both of these dynamics.
A. Expertise: The Corporatization of Politics
In the context of mass violence, much of the focus of international
intervention has been on developing expertise in the science of
transition that would engender a political order that respects rights
and promotes democracy. The project is seen as a pragmatic and
non-political effort to fight the turbulence of violent conflict through
the promise of a democratic order that is a prequel to democratic
politics. As one commentator puts it, ―[t]he idea of transitional
governance may be seen as a pragmatic stepping-stone in a
democracy-building process.‖10 Thus the field itself has developed
best practices, good governance models, and methodologies for
implementation.11 It has indicia of success that establish objective
benchmarks and target criteria.12 Good governance in relation to the
body politic is modeled on the domain of assessment that is the
habitus of corporate governance.13
Another dimension of this trajectory is that democracy promotion
becomes a matter pertaining to the science of politics rather than
politics itself; Bhuta situates this as a deeply modern ―machine
10. Naazneen H. Barma, Brokered Democracy-Building: Developing Democracy
Through Transitional Governance in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, 8 INT‘L J. ON
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 127, 127, 139 (2006), available at http://www.unesco.org/shs/
ijms/vol8/issue2/art1 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
11. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Governance for Sustainable Human Development, at 2–3
(1997), available at http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/undp/governance/undppolicy
doc97-e.pdf.
12. Linz and Stepan describe the indices as follows: 1) behaviorally, when no significant
actors attempt to create a nondemocratic regime or turn to violence or secession; 2)
attitudinally, when a strong majority of public opinion believes that democratic procedures
and institutions are the best way to govern their collective life; and 3) constitutionally, when
governmental and non-governmental forces alike are subjected to and habituated to conflict
resolution within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions laid out by the new
democratic process. Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 14. This is a great example of what Nehal Bhuta calls an
―Archimedean Law-Giver‖ in Against State-Building, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 517, 518 (2008).
13. To the point where even the incentive structure for leadership models itself on
corporate bonuses; thus, over the last few years a fund has been established to make dollar
payouts to African leaders who transfer power and resist corruption.
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dream‖ that embodies what Hans Morgenthau found to be ―a defining
characteristic of modern liberalism.‖14 Bhuta quotes Morgenthau‘s
1940 lecture at the New School for Social Research situating this as
the trajectory of a ―political philosophy‖ born out of the conviction
that it ―was justified in light of reason and was, therefore, beyond the
reach of historical change . . . .‖15 What this leads to, for Morgenthau, is the dangerous and self-deceiving understanding of politics as
technology, a mode of political being that forgets its own historical
determinacy and engages with all politics, everywhere, as if political
and social spaces were homogeneous.16 From the domain of
economics to the domain of law, this vision gets augmented when
exported; empowered by the backdrop of violence, it gets augmented
further when exported to post-conflict contexts; cleansed of any
historical reminders of path dependence, it gets exported as formula.
The dominant voice of human rights promotion in post-conflict
environments is the voice of expertise, and if there is a dominant
culture, it is the culture of technocratic state craft that Bhuta describes
so powerfully. Thus, different kinds of rights are accompanied by
different subfields of what we may term ‗rights technocrats‘ who
have expertise on the relevant legal doctrines and best policy
practices—the best labs where these questions have been worked out
under different conditions. Thus across a spectrum of issues there
science has been channeled into a mobile industry of professionalized
global expertise that can then be exported to new markets. We are
steered to Germany for models on proportionate representation and
multi-party democracy, to Canada or Switzerland for case studies on
federalism, to South Africa for transitional justice processes, to
Northern Ireland for police reform initiatives and so on. Thus
international engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process involved
field trips to ‗model countries‘ to study the best formulas for
federalism, language policy, transitional justice and institutional
reform. In fact, Sri Lanka is not alone. For instance, across the
14. Bhuta, supra note 12. Bhuta notes, id. at 535 n.7, that he takes the phrase ―machine
dream‖ from Philip Mirowski‘s book on the history and epistemology of economics, PHILIP
MIROWSKI, MACHINE DREAMS: ECONOMICS BECOMES A CYBORG SCIENCE (2002).
15. Bhuta, supra note 12, at 519 (quoting HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN
VERSUS POWER POLITICS 3 (Midway prtg. 1974) (1946)).
16. As will be seen infra, this envisioning of political space as Euclidean and
homogeneous was an essential characteristic of both liberal justifications of empire, and is a
necessary presumption of more contemporary theories of modernization, rational choice and
institutional design.

13 NESIAH (DO NOT DELETE)

4/29/2009 12:57 PM

142

[Vol. 24:135

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

world, local elites from dozens of countries deemed as ‗conflict
zones‘ have been shipped out to Canada or Switzerland to study
federalism and concomitantly experts from these countries have then
visited conflict environments and convene seminars on rights
promotion, develop draft constitutions, and clarify appropriate
international norms and standards for entrenching minority rights
provisions through a federal framework. Pluralism here is not about
politics, but about knowledge.
Significantly, this is not an old fashioned clunker of an industry
that is exporting a single ready-made model. Rather it has an agility
that accompanies its mobility, a theory of the ‗social‘ that
accompanies its‘ science.17 Thus the project of reproducing a variant
of these constitutions in a country like Sri Lanka becomes a project of
translation, adding a local accent that ‗vernacularizes‘ expert knowledge.18 A generation ago, many post-colonial critics were urging
greater focus on ―the local‖ or lamenting formulaic rule of law
projects that disregarded context. Today, there are few contexts
where international intervention is not already foregrounding the
local. In this sense ‗the machine dream‘ has been tweaked with local
color. From the U.N. to INGOs, there is widespread reference to the
importance of folding local context and customary law into these
nation-building efforts for rights and democracy promotion projects
to be sustainable. Attention to local context in ―getting the law right‖
becomes a critical ―part of helping rebuild the State,‖ according to the
United Nations Development Program‘s Rule of Law Team Leader
Sue Tatten in discussing interventions in Sudan.19 She says:
17. Kerry Rittich notes that attention to the ‗social‘ has become appropriated in dominant
approaches to rule of law development by institutions such as the World Bank. Kerry
Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 199, 227 (2004).
18. The language of ‗vernacularizing‘ human rights was introduced by Sally Merry to
argue that human rights are never exported without being transformed by local struggles.
See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: The Ka Ho’
okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawai’i, 1993, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND
CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 28 (Richard A. Wilson ed. 1997). The term
‗vernacularization‘ evocatively captured how the human rights framework travelled. Merry
saw this as a positive process of local appropriation that pluralizes the trajectories that
emanate from the Universal Declaration. However, it can also be a process of appropriation
of the local, of ‗going native‘ in ways that advances the hegemony of the rights framework
over all alternative discourses of justice.
19. United Nations Development Programme Newsroom, New Seeds of Justice Sown in
Southern Sudan (June 14, 2007), http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2007/june/new-seeds-
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―[p]eople need to know that they will be able to resolve their disputes
in a way that‘s impartial and equitable according to Southern
Sudanese standards.‖20 In the case of Sudan, the UNDP decides that
‗vernacularizing state building means keeping both options open, the
formal court system and the customary law courts, but adapting the
way the latter works so that it is in line with constitutional principles
and protects human rights. In other words, the invocation of the local
is not a counter to the regime of best practices and universal
standards, but one that gets seamlessly folded into that regime.21 The
most important issue here is not the extent to which local knowledge
or interests are incorporated, but about how the project of ‗going
native‘ becomes assimilated into what Bhuta describes as ―the
Archimedean law-giver,‖ as the authoritative figure in relation to any
of these constitutional projects.22
Democracy itself emerges as a matter of expertise regarding the
management of state institutions and political processes in ways that
can overshadow any focus on the dynamic of political interests and
choices regarding resources and ideologies. In fact, in some cases,
this authorizes a foundational and arbitrative role for professional
expertise regarding the architecture of rights-promoting societies that
can argue for the delimiting of democracy itself. For instance, the
international community debated how election rules in Afghanistan
should be shaped in order to prohibit the Taliban from running for
elected office. In Gaza, the democratic elections that saw Hamas
emerge as the people‘s choice was seen to have produced results that
were inimical to the management of political order and rights
promotion. This position was not advanced as ideological opposition
to Hamas; rather, it was the judgment of experts in rights and
of-justice-sown-in-southern-sudan.en (last visited March 24, 2009).
20. Id.
21. Clearly, even those who see rule of law and rights promotion in the most technical
terms also have a discourse about ‗vernacularizing‘ their interventions and are keen to
incorporate a consumable package of ‗culture‘ as part of the check-list of technical elements
needed to advance rule of law projects. For instance, Rosa Brooks, a Georgetown human
rights lawyer involved in rule of law projects in Iraq, applauds military JAG officers in Iraq
―speaking fluent Arabic,‖ saying that that one ―lesson‖ to keep in mind is that we should
―[k]now the culture and the language well.‖ Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Panel 1: Establishing
the Rule of Law, 33 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 119, 134 (2004). Describing the enormity of the
challenge, she notes that ―building the rule of law in post-conflict societies is . . . much
harder than getting those rovers up to Mars, because you are dealing with human beings and
not machines.‖ ‗Culture‘ is needed to grease the wheels of ‗the machine dream.‘ Id. at 133.
22. Bhuta, supra note 12, at 518.
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democracy.
My interest in this context is not the specificities of global IsraeliPalestinian politics, but the power of the discourse of expertise in
democratic rights in authorizing some democratic choices and
delegitimating others. The modality of political thinking promoted
here has been described by Wendy Brown as a ―neo-liberal political
rationality, a rationality that exceeds particular positions on particular
issues.‖23 As Brown notes, this is not just about the market—in fact
the economy may not even be the primary focus24—but about
―extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and
social actions.‖25 In that sense it is not contradictory for the rights
and democracy promotion regime to oppose the results of democratic
decision making in Gaza. This is a discourse grounded in a notion of
political rationality that is embedded in specific models of political
order so that some political choices (such as those of the Gaza
population in electing Hamas) can be seen as objectively irrational.
Rights and democracy promotion is about the tutelage of postconflict citizens to create ownership of the background rules that will
allow ‗rational‘ choices, and discourage ‗irrational‘ ones. It is in this
sense that Brown notes that neo-liberal political rationality can defeat
liberal democracy. The political subjectivity engendered by the
rights and democracy promotion interventions is one that exercises
neo-liberal rationality rather than one that is open to a multiplicity of
political rationalities.
The authoritative role of rights and democracy promotion
initiatives in shaping the architecture of political life is not unrelated
to the political economy of the post-conflict industry. In keeping
with trends over the last decade, budget figures for the last year show
that ―democratic governance remains the largest priority area,‖
accounting for over 40% of ―UNDP‘s overall expenditures.‖26 The
UNDP is not alone on this—rights and democracy promotion is a
23. WENDY BROWN, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORK:
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37, 37 (2005).
24. Although in some cases the ‗market‘ orientation of political decision may be
precisely the test for the rationality of the choices made. For example, advancing a political
rationality that knits neo-liberal market choices to progress, the U.S. State Department was
also ambivalent or even hostile to democratic elections in Bolivia and Venezuela.
25. BROWN, supra note 23, at 40.
26. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ANNUAL REPORT 2007: MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK FOR
ALL 20–27 (2007), http://www.undp.org/publications/annualreport2007/IAR07-ENG.pdf.
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policy and budgetary priority for the wider donor community. It is
also a priority for institutions such as the World Bank that were not
perceived to have a mandate that is directly focused on political
systems as such, but nevertheless see rights promotion as an integral
part of the development project in post-conflict environments.
Moreover, some elements of the international human rights regime
such as the right to property are seen as particularly important in
advancing the rule of law and development. For instance, the
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, co-chaired by Mary
Robinson, Hernando De Soto, and Madeline Albright, has been
urging the human rights community to do more in advancing
universal property rights as a critical inheritance of the UDHR. 27
Influenced by De Soto and like-minded economists, the World Bank
has been urging Sri Lanka to advance universal property rights by
taking the legislative steps necessary to grant property rights to small
farmers in Sri Lanka. Significantly, the World Bank first made the
proposal in 1996, but it took full flower and got translated into draft
legislation only in the context of the peace process six years later,
when it took root within the wider framework of nation building and
post-conflict development. The context of ‗transition‘ heralded by
the peace process lubricated many of the Bank-sponsored reforms in
the name of nation building. The Sri Lankan peace process is not
atypical here in the doors it opens to pro-market reforms in the name
of poverty alleviation and human rights. For instance, seeking to
address a variety of post-conflict contexts, a Danish Foreign Ministry
paper urges that there is a ―correlation between conflict and poverty
and their integral link to human rights performance‖ in urging
interventions that go beyond the traditional human rights focus on
abuses suffered by civilians to treat these contexts as ―fragile states‖
that require ―reconstruction.‖28 Seeking to marry ethics and expertise, the paper urges ―a meta-analysis of human rights data across
fragile states to identify strategic and tactical factors relevant to
nation building.‖29 Thus from South Africa to Iraq, De Soto‘s
proposals for property rights have gained traction with the World

27. See, e.g., Mary Robinson, Taking Stock of the Human Rights Agenda 60 Years On,
24 MD. J. INT‘L L. 1, 6 (2009).
28. Derek G. Evans, Human Rights and State Fragility 3 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/PPPG/politics_and_governance/publications/HRFS_Evans_frame
work_paper.pdf.
29. Id.
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Bank and other international actors in the wake of ‗transitions‘ and
nation-building efforts that take place against the backdrop of
violence and the foregrounding of human rights.
Interestingly the groups targeted by the property rights initiative
such as the agricultural workers who are part of the Sri Lankan
Movement for National Land and Agricultural Reform or the South
African shack dweller‘s organization, Abahlali baseMjondolo have
opposed initiatives to grant full property rights, arguing that the right
to alienate property would soon lead to dispossession, given the
context of large-scale debt and wide socio-economic disparities.30
Even when gift wrapped with the UDHR, these groups see that short
term ownership will inevitably lead to long term alienation; thus the
extension of rights emerges for them as part of the hegemonic order
rather than a counter-hegemonic initiative. In contexts of deep
inequality these groups see the right to full title leading to
commodification and dispossession. Yet from the stand point of the
new market oriented rationality that these transitional reconstruction
projects are seeking to engender, perhaps the perspective of these
agricultural workers and squatters reflects a subjectivity produced by
a still stunted modernity. It is a perspective that stands in tension
with the rule of law and rights promotion effort. One U.S. State
Department official describes the work of rights and democracy
promotion as creating subjects who will make different kinds of
choices about the very fabric of their society.31 From international
civil society initiatives, such as the Robinson-de Soto commission, to
multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank, to donor countries
such as the U.S., there are a range of international efforts promoting
rights and democracy as integral to goals such as development or
peace. In this landscape, human rights are embedded into a sweeping
political rationality that is hegemonic rather than embattled, the
discourse of management, not resistance.
B. Ethics: The Pre-emption of the Political
The turn to ethics is distinct from the turn to ‗expertise‘ but it may
function in ways that are complementary in the post-conflict context.

30. See Vasuki Nesiah & Nanthikesan, Betting on Dispossession, LINES, Aug. 2003,
http://www.lines-magazine.org/Art_Aug03/Vasuki.htm.
31. Bhuta, supra note 12.
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By ―ethics‖ I refer to international initiatives invested in the
advancement of norms of victim-centered human rights against the
backdrop of genocide, war, and conflict. Human rights are not just a
discourse of law and rules; alongside the discourse of instrumental
rationality, highlighted in the discussion of expertise, is a discourse
that speaks of global moral responsibility. The backdrop of genocide
has been invoked from Sudan to Cambodia to urge international
action to protect victims and provide redress.
In recent years, explicit invocations of the ethical in international
political discourse in U.N. corridors, NGO workshops, national
policy initiatives, and such has spawned a range of different
initiatives (from the international ad hoc tribunals to the Responsibility to Protect) that have been advanced in the name of an
ethical imperative to act. This has had a directly regulative arm that
has pulled different countries into courtroom dramas and military
interventions in pursuit of those guilty of violence. It has also had an
indirectly regulative reach through a plethora of initiatives aimed at
norm diffusion, hoping to develop a culture of rights and democracy
that will trump a culture of violence. The focus on building a liberal
culture in post-conflict environments has many dimensions, but I
would like to highlight two dominant platforms that are wrapped in
the turn to ethics talk: firstly the liberal peace thesis, and secondly the
discourse on women as victims of war.
The ethical vision of the liberal peace thesis that is dominant in the
post-conflict human rights and peace-building literature is the
argument that peace (both international and domestic) is promoted,
and civil war averted, with an embrace of liberal democracy.32 The
overarching model of rights and pluralism that has been advanced by
international actors in relation to the Sri Lankan peace process
reflects two dominant characteristics of rights promotion discourse
within this framework. Loosely grouped, these include a juridical–
political discourse of multi-ethnic citizenship and minority rights on
the one hand,33 and a normative and public policy foundation for
tolerance, conflict resolution, and co-existence on the other.34 The
32. See R. J. Rummel, Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder, 39 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 3 (1995).
33. Thus, as noted earlier, much of the intervention has been focused on bringing in
constitutional expertise from outside and taking political leaders to Canada and Switzerland
on pluralism field trips.
34. For instance, many of the initiatives in this context were aimed at bringing together
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promise is that norms injected through liberal constitutionalism and
married to liberal pluralism in the public sphere can establish
institutions that promote and protect tolerance and engender
interethnic reconciliation. As Turner argues, ―[l]iberal peace assumptions litter the policy documents of the UN, the international financial
institutions and Western governments‖ in ways that have justified a
range of interventions to promote liberalism, from diplomacy to
sanctions and military intervention.35 Within this framework, mass
violence operates as a free-floating signifier that cleanses international intervention of any political implications for the distribution
of resources. Staging intervention on a tableau of human rights
makes it part of a universal progress narrative. Here intervention is
merely the responsibility to act; it is the heeding of the ethical call.
As Spivak notes, here the ―idea of human rights . . . may carry within
it a kind of Social Darwinism: the fittest must shoulder the burden of
righting the wrongs of the unfit‖ such that ―the breaking of the new
nations‖ can be conducted ―in the name of their breaking-in into the
international community of nations.‖36
The ethical turn within post-conflict interventions cannot be
reduced to an imperialist impulse; in fact, the field itself may be
driven by largely altruistic impulses—be they at the individual level37
or at the level of political institutions and dynamics of the
international community. However, the ethical turn captured in the
embrace of the liberal peace thesis may be premised on assumptions
regarding rights and collective identities under electoral democracy
that are fundamentally mistaken. For instance, translating a peace
process into a human rights framework may entrench essentialized
identities and simplify social relations. Sieder and Witchell argue
that this was the impact of the Guatemalan peace process on Mayan

different groups of people from the South and the North; from workshops for women
entrepreneurs from the North and South, to interfaith dialogues amongst Sri Lanka‘s
religious leaders, the effort was to build the associative ties that engender solidarities within
a liberal normative habitus.
35. Mandy Turner, Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the
Election of Hamas, 13 DEMOCRATIZATION 739, 742 (2006).
36. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Righting Wrongs, in HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS
164, 169, 171 (Nicholas Owen ed., 2003).
37. As David Kennedy notes, many human rights practitioners may seek to ―do well
while doing good.‖ David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 101 (2002).
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justice claims; it superimposed a normative framework and an
institutional process that channeled those claims (through ‗human
rights‘ idioms such as multiculturalism) in ways that transformed
them.38 In some cases this process made them more vulnerable to
abuse by powerful social groups because the concerns that became
entrenched in the peace process and attendant rule of projects do not
respond to local power relations, and even distracted from struggles
that would have addressed and challenged those social structures.39
Peace processes can subscribe to the myth of neutral constitutions
and electoral arrangements and occlude their impact on distribution
and social hierarchy. For instance, in the Sri Lankan context, periods
of violence and civil war were not just a ―random time-capsule‖ or
unexpected ―tectonic slips;‖ rather, there were several ideological or
material features of the preceding periods of ―normal‖ politics that
enabled that ―slip.‖ One of the ideological blinders that occluded the
visibility of those enabling conditions was the humanist myth of
violence as wholly ‗other‘ to the domain of ‗normal‘ liberal politics.
Coming to terms with the specific scars and tears of the civil war
requires that we trace back through history to identify the
characteristics of ―normal‖ politics that were enabling conditions of
violence and unpack received mythologies about a previous era when
Sri Lanka was touted as a ―model democracy.‖ That was not an era
of ethical innocence but years where violence was contained only to
fester, derailed only to be deferred; normal politics was characterized
by constitutionalized anti-minority discrimination. Rather than
electoral democracy functioning to halt majoritarianism, the ballot
box amplified the arithmetic reach of tyranny by the majority. 40
Violence may well emerge as the repressed underside of the electoral
logic. This is not an argument against liberal democracy but merely
the argument that an easy discourse of communal harmony and
38. See Rachel Sieder & Jessica Witchell, Advancing Indigenous Claims Through Law:
Reflections on the Guatemalan Peace Process, in CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 201 (Jane K. Cowan et. al. eds., 2001).
39. Id.
40. For instance, David Scott notes that the Donoughmore Constitution rejected an
ethnically structured electoral system as fuelling moribund communal solidarities and
instead opted for the ‗unencumbered‘ vote that would operate on the ostensibly neutral
arithmetic of electoral majorities and minorities. Thus it naturalized the logic of ‗number‘ in
ways that, in effect, rewarded numerical majorities as being on the side of rationality,
progress, and democratic modernity. Ironically, however, this became the very enabling
condition of majoritarianism discussed by David Scott in REFASHIONING FUTURES: CRITICISM
AFTER POSTCOLONIALITY (1999).
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reconciliation contained by the liberal peace thesis can generate a
dangerous amnesia regarding the deprivations and exclusions that
catalyzed political alienation and militarism in the first place.
The ‗ethical turn‘ in post-conflict interventions is also characterized by a potentially problematic discourse on victims and
perpetrators. For instance, one prominent dimension of ‗ethics talk‘
focusing on conflict victims is the production of women as victims,
as captured in the 2008 passage of Security Council Resolution 1820
on Sexual Violence.41 Amongst other concerns, the particular focus
on sexual violence and the restriction of women‘s subjectivity in
conflict to bodies that have suffered that injury42 privileges bodily
integrity injuries such as sexual violence, rather than any more
complex socio-political analysis of these conflicts. Only the metanarrative of victimhood has brought women onto the international
post-conflict radar screen and allowed them to participate in the
‗promise‘ of the international law and policy interventions of
tribunals and Security Council resolutions. This may provide a
classic instance of Wendy Brown‘s analysis of ‗wounded attachments.‘43 As Brown notes, investment in an identity of injury can
curb our political imagination and limits our ability to stake out more
transformative political claims. Rather than engagements that
subvert the naturalized priorities of post-conflict justice, the victim
paradigm seeks inclusion within its framework. Rather than expose
the biases inherent in universalized thresholds of ―shock the
conscience‖ international crime, it seeks representation of sexual
crimes within that pantheon of privileged rights violations. Thus
when Ban ki-Moon ―announced plans to shortly appoint a Messenger
of Peace tasked entirely with advocacy for ending violence against
women,‖44 we should see the ―entirely‖ as a description of the limit of
victim politics, rather than an expansive recognition of its

41. For a more extended discussion, see VASUKI NESIAH, 1325 AND A NUMBER OF
UNCOMFORTABLE ALLIANCES IN SOUTH ASIAN FEMINISMS (forthcoming) (on file with
author).
42. For instance, when the Category One crimes of the post-genocide trials in Rwanda
classify rape in the same ‗box‘ as murder—it may actually accentuate women‘s experience
of victimization from rape as a fate equivalent to death.
43. See Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments, 21 POL. THEORY 390 (1993).
44. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands Immediate and
Complete Halt to Acts of Sexual Violence Against Civilians in Conflict Zones, Unanimously
Adopting Resolution 1820, U.N. Doc. SC/9364 (June 19, 2008) (emphasis added).
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significance. More generally, the mobilization of the victim–
perpetrator dichotomy that is so crucial to dominant approaches to
transitional justice simplifies complex histories where victims can
also be perpetrators.45 Relatedly, as Mamdani has argued in the
context of apartheid South Africa, the relationship between victims
and beneficiaries of human rights violations may provide us a better
map to the histories of atrocity that post-conflict societies need to
confront.46
The preceding discussion has highlighted the liberal peace thesis
and the discourse on women‘s victimization as some of the dominant
accompaniments to the ethical turn in international post-conflict
interventions. Taking a step back, we should also look more
fundamentally at the work done by this turn to ethics talk in the first
place. What does it mean to contest violence through a call to the
international community‘s ethical responsibilities? We need to
examine how human rights and democracy promotion initiatives
depict the terrain that justifies their intervention. For instance,
invoking U.N.-speak for describing ―the tectonic slips and brutal
human violence‖ of these environments, one author describes ―postconflict countries‖ as ―the least favorable environments in which
democracy can take hold and flourish . . . home to populations with
sociopolitical cleavages that have led to and become hardened by
violent civil conflict.‖47 This is the cue for the international community to enter bearing rights, with the ghost of genocide looking
over its shoulder, to seed the democratic promise. Thus, the author
goes on to say: ―[y]et the international community, led by the UN,
acts on the belief that a democratic political system is best suited to
managing political conflict and presumes to be able to build
democratic institutions in these post-conflict countries.‖48 The
framing of human rights through the foregrounding of this backdrop
of violence shapes post-conflict interventions as the indispensable,
politically neutral ingredient to engage with, and overcome,
incendiary violence and its accompanying brutalities. Socio-political

45. See, for example, Mamdani‘s elaboration of the historical processes in relation to the
Rwandan genocide in MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS:
COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2002).
46. See Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 32 DIACRITICS 33 (2002).
47. Barma, supra note 10, at 128.
48. Id.
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interests are removed from both ends of this story—violence is seen
to over-determine politics in the contexts of intervention, while the
discourses of human rights over-determine the politics of the
intervention.
It is worth noting that this is not merely a discourse of
contemporary human rights practice, but even more significantly the
broader script within which the UDHR emerges as a driving force of
history. Analyzing the Declaration‘s effort to condemn, police, and
prohibit cruelty, Talal Asad notes that it is a founding premise of the
modernist conception of the human that ―the extension of rights‖ is
―crucial for the elimination of cruelty.‖49 The post-conflict environment is not political in any way that is not reducible to the cruelties of
uncontrolled violence; therefore, international interventions in the
name of rights that combat violence are by definition legitimate. It
may be our norms pitted against their practices,50 but, following
Asad, we also note that the story of the Universal Declaration is both
a story of what it means to be human and a story about the
progressive prohibition of the inhuman.51 By representing politics in
the environment in which it intervenes as another dimension of
inhuman violence, the whole field is evacuated of the usual reference
points of sovereignty or self-determination that would otherwise
frame our analysis of international intervention. Instead these ethical
wrappings deter critique and defer to the promise of progress.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some see the current phase of international intervention in postconflict environments as simply the new phase of a long tradition
going from colonial governance to the mandate system to
contemporary territorial administration. However, today the ‗international‘ is peopled not by colonizers in the old model but the U.N.,
INGOs, donor governments, and local elites. While, undoubtedly,
‗empire‘ plays a role in the geo-political imperatives and enabling
conditions of these interventions, we cannot reduce these inter49. Talal Asad, On Torture, or Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 111, 112 (Richard A.
Wilson ed., 1997).
50. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY
AND EMPIRE (2006).
51. Asad, supra note 49, at 111.
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ventions to manifestations of ‗empire‘ anymore than we can reduce
the UDHR to an updated version of the charter of the British East
Indian Company. From Sri Lanka to Zimbabwe, political leaders
have invoked colonialism and protested invocations of human rights
as means of defending their abuse of power and running interference
with transnational solidarities that may reflect the UDHR‘s best
promise. Undoubtedly, the UDHR has provided an important
touchstone for many disenfranchised communities seeking a signpost
or shield in the struggle for justice in the context of war and civil
conflict. Without diminishing that legacy, this paper has sought to
highlight the underside of mobilizing UDHR‘s humanist promise to
depict the terrain of violence. Intervening in a context where there
will be many celebrations of UDHR‘s positive legacy, this paper has
sought to follow a more neglected line of inquiry by tracking how the
representation of violence by human rights, rule of law, and
democracy promotion initiatives fuels a new currency for
intervention that may generate a more troubling yield.
Mobilizing the representations of violence and cruelty is not
without antecedents in other spaces and places in ways that aim
towards different ends but with parallel dynamics. For instance,
representations of Peruvian indigenous communities as marked by
violence, cannibalism, and terror functioned as a ―phantasmic social
force‖ enabling structures of domination that were invoked by the
Europeans in forcing the Putumayo region into commodity
production.52 More contemporaneously, the depiction of the urban
ghetto as marked by ―crime, pathology, and moral decay‖ has been
an enabling factor in empowering the state to deploy a violent police
presence and heightened criminalization of the everyday. 53 Whether
in these contexts, or in the post-conflict environments with which this
paper has been preoccupied, the ―iconography of evil . . . is
indissolubly welded to images of paradise and the good,‖54 which, in
our case, is the extended arc of rights, rule of law, and democracy
52. See MICHAEL TAUSSIG, SHAMANISM, COLONIALISM, AND THE WILD MAN: A STUDY IN
TERROR AND HEALING (1987).
53. See Henry A. Giroux, Racism and the Aesthetic of Hyper-real Violence: Pulp Fiction
and Other Visual Tragedies, 1 SOC. IDENTITIES 333 (1995), available at http://archive.freire.
mcgill.ca/385/1/racism_and_the_aesthetic_of_hyper-real_violence.pdf (last visited Mar. 26,
2009).
54. I borrow my language from Taussig to highlight the parallel with the way he links
European depictions of the violence of the other with the celebration of the self. TAUSSIG,
supra note 52.
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that are the progeny of UDHR. These contrasting representations are
―indissolubly welded together‖ in making the case for intervention all
the more urgent and the promise of redemption all the more salutary.
At the same time, our understanding of their structural links is
sundered so that the discourse of violence, terror, and failed states
generates a structural ―distance and moral privilege‖ that places the
international community ―outside of the web of violence and social
responsibility.‖55 And so the story goes—if not for the intervention
of the post-conflict industry, things fall apart.

55. Again, I borrow my language from Giroux to highlight the parallel with the way the
depiction of urban violence helps distance dominant society from its enabling conditions.
Giroux, supra note 53, at 334.

